Blood (2005) Body Work: The Social Construction of Women’s Body Image

Sylvia Blood regards ‘embodiment’ as a theoretical model that binds the ‘mind’ and ‘body’ together through a dialectical interplay between these two concepts. ‘Embodiment’ constitutes the foundation of her critique of experimental psychology’s approach to women’s body image research. Her main thesis is that clinical psychologists have identified the cause of ‘body image problem’ as residing within women’s mind rather than as a product of wider social power relations. Instead of focusing on cognitive ‘traits’ she examines the role of social influences that shape women’s body image perception. By adopting social constructionist stance she exposes the hegemonic discourses that legitimise mainstream psychology’s research about women’s body image.




The strengths of the Blood’s work

The most important aspect of Blood’s work is the way in which she draws upon Discourse Analysis (DA) to provide alternative discourses through which women’s embodiment can be reconceptualised. It is worth mentioning here that DA is a methodology that subscribes to relativist ontology and its epistemological underpinnings are social constructionist in nature (Johnstone, 2002; Potter et al, 1990; Billing, 1985; Garfinkel, 1967; Gee, 1999). This means that DA challenges the assumption that Psychology can produce ‘scientific’ data concerning women’s bodies (Gleeson & Frith, 2006; Sloan, 2000). Drawing upon DA, Blood argued that ‘scientific’ ways of conceptualising women’s bodies can only exist through social consensus and discourse. She insisted that ‘scientific’ discourses about women’s embodiment construct ideal forms of ‘body image’ rather than representing an objective ‘truth’ about women’s bodies. Therefore, the strengths of her arguments lies on the way in which it compels experimental psychologists to regard language as a constructive tool which ‘writes’ particular versions of reality that are not ‘truth’ or ‘valid’.



The weaknesses of Blood’s arguments

Since that Blood argues that no one version of reality can be seen as ‘valid’ or ‘truth’, who is to say that her own perspective regards women’s body image is superior to those of experimental psychologists? Additionally, presenting only one of a number of interpretations is particularly problematic, given that DA challenges dominant ideologies. Moreover, by adopting discourse analytic principles, Bloods work risks culminating in a nihilistic relativism (see Raskin, 2001; Fletcher, 1996; Raskin, 2002). This is, if no reading or interpretation regarding women’s body image experience is said to be right or valid the identification of discourse in texts and language is no more than a mere academic exercise (see Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Speer, 2001a). Or if all ‘readings’ and interpretations are equally valid Blood cannot claim that women are ‘really’ being oppressed (see Burr, 1995, Speer, 2001b). So, to this extent, on what grounds can Blood promote her own versions of ‘truth’ regarding psychological phenomena such as ‘body image dysfunction’?




Evaluating Blood’s contribution in terms of its implications

Despite some weaknesses, Blood’s work provides useful insights into understanding complex and subtle discursive work surrounding women’s body image research. For instance, Slade and Russell (1973) conducted experimental research on body size estimation and interpreted overestimation of body width as evidence of ‘body image distortion’. One can argue that this view regards women’s bodies as a psychological construct (Ussher, 1997; Kontos, 2004). In this respect, Blood suggested that when “working with women with difficulties with food and embodiment, the aim is to help women to move away from viewing their body as an object that can be molded and shaped and to move towards experiencing their bodies as lived in” (p. 125). This quote clearly demonstrates how an epistemological shift from experimental psychology can provide an alternative views about women’s body which emphasizes women’s ‘inner’ bodily awareness. In this way, Blood’s work challenge experimental psychologists to consider the material consequences of uncritically using dominant forms of knowledge about women’s body image. So to this extent, Blood’s thesis constitutes a vital contribution since that it bridges the gap between biology and the environment by locating women’s body image anxieties in wider social power relations, language and discourse.



This view is shared by Parker (1999a) who asserted that diagnostic labels such as ‘body image distortion’ reflect dominant meanings emerging from language and discourse in different socio-political contexts. Thus, it becomes evident that language, meaning and socio-historical context are inextricably interrelated (Potter & Edwards, 1990; Parker, 1999b). One can argue, therefore, that the knowledge produced by experimental psychologists regarding women’s body is culturally and historically specific (Markula, 2001; Witz, 2000; Antaki, 2006). It simply reflects the demands of western capitalism where “women are socialized to conform to a particular body shape in order to be sexually attractive to, and compete for, a man who would then, supposedly take care of her economic needs” (Blood, 2005: 44). This quote clearly demonstrates how predominant scientific and industrial-capitalist discourses are closely bound with political and economic pressures where ‘women’ are forced to conform to acceptable categories of femininity (Hollway, 2000; Kitzinger & Frith, 1999).


In order to bridge the social/natural divide and overcome the nature/culture dualism, Blood’s work proposes a model that binds ‘mind’ and ‘body’ together by focusing in the interplay between these two concepts. She insisted that this emphasis on the mind/body divide underpins the notion that individuals are stable and with a coherent identity that can be defined in terms of rational (male) or irrational (female). In this way, language operates in a system of binary oppositions in which power relations become evident and the notion of ‘otherness’ is constructed (Hepburn, 1997; Hughes & Witz, 1997; Focault, 1972; Hedgecoe, 2001; Shilling, 2001). For instance, male bodies are perceived as ‘normal’ and female bodies as ‘abnormal’. In this respect, Shildrik (2002) commented the following:

“If we know what we are by what we are not, the other, in its apparent separation and distinction, serves a positive function of securing the boundaries of the self”
(Shildrik, 2002: 17)

Drawing upon the above quote we can argue that the identification of the ‘other’ allows a definition of the ‘normal’ (see Shilling, 1993). Thus, whilst ‘normality’ empowers men, categories such as ‘body image distortion’ exclude labelled women from mainstream society (Scott & Morgan, 1993). This process distorts reality and allows women’s body image to become psychologized and social control to operate in the name of ‘mental health’ (Potter & Edwards, 1990, Potter, 2000). Thus, Blood’s assumptions lead us to believe that so long as the social and political dimensions of experimental psychology remain hidden and inexplicit, its ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ credibility will remain limited.



Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be evident that adopting DA for conceptualizing women’s embodiment is challenging since that its relativist stance raises certain problems in terms of its practical application. Nevertheless, DA is widely accepted as a ‘tool’ that provides rigorous and systematic means of addressing gender issues and formulating solutions for political change (Mather, 2000; Woolgar, 1988; Stam, 2000). Hence, we must conclude that Blood’s thesis constitutes a useful contribution towards the sociological understanding of the body, since that it effectively addresses the complexity of women's embodiment by taking into consideration that the ‘body’ is a more complex, fluid and context depended concept. Moreover, Blood’s approach invites us to regard women’s body anxieties as a product of wider social power relations rather than as individual ‘problem’. Additionally, her work exposes the way in which experimental psychology obscures the ‘agentic’, dynamic and productive features of women’s engagement with their bodies.